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Procurement Contracts under Limited Liability
Abstract: This paper analyses procurement when contractors have limited liability and when the
sponsor cannot commit to any specific form of future negotiation. It shows that introducing limited
liability enhances competition and thus the likelihood of bankruptcy. Among efficient auctions in
which only the winner gets paid, the commonly used first price auction is shown to give the lowest
probability of bankruptcy. Finally, it shows that the characterisation of a mechanism minimising
the project’s cost results from trading-off bankruptcy costs with informational rents.
I INTRODUCTION
I
n procurement contracting, tenders must generally be submitted at a stage
where there is still much uncertainty. Part of this uncertainty results from
possible imperfect information regarding future costs or the exact
characteristics of the product to be supplied. Another part is potentially
associated with the sponsor being unable, or even unwilling, to commit to any
specific future negotiation in the event of cost overruns. Indeed, the type of
agreements that can be made in practice are often limited.
Under these circumstances, costs estimates and the level of liability are the
only factors contractors can rely on when submitting tenders. Thus, in the
absence of any form of future agreements, limited liability plays a crucial role
as it determines the extent to which a contract can be enforced. It is then
important, for those who decide on procurement rules, to understand how
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University College Dublinlimited liability constraints affect the contractors’ initial bidding decisions, as
well as the outcome (e.g. the contracted price, the likelihood of bankruptcy) of
the rules they set. This paper examines bidding under limited liability in the
absence of specific future agreements. It highlights some possible
consequences of limited liability constraints and compares the performance of
different procurement rules. Although the analysis relies on a theoretical
model, the results are informative from an applied point of view and of
potential interest to policy makers.
In the literature, limited liability is often introduced as an ex post voluntary
participation constraint. Formally, it states that the contract cannot be
enforced whenever the contractor’s profit falls below a certain level. Its
implications then depend on the sponsor’s ability and willingness to enforce
the contract. In Riordan and Sappington (1988), the sponsor can either use
contingent prices,1 or can commit to negotiate a price in a second period, once
all uncertainty is resolved. Contingent prices are set such that bankruptcy will
not arise. Thus, they eliminate the possible distortions resulting from facing a
potentially binding limited liability constraint. Unfortunately, in practice, it is
often impossible for the sponsor to anticipate all future contingencies and
therefore to write and rely on complete contracts. Without this possibility,
limited liability constraints are likely to have a greater impact. When the price
is negotiated ex post, an auction is used in a first period to select a contractor.
To prevent the submission of very low tenders that would decrease the first
period rent and make it impossible for the contractor to cover his cost, a
minimal acceptable bid is imposed. These authors then show that the limited
liability constraints then hold at the expense of efficiency. Indeed, in some
cases, all contractors submit the minimal acceptable bid in the auction (this
forms a so-called pooling equilibrium). In such a case, the auction does not
allow one to identify and select the most efficient contractor. Committing to
future negotiations is not always feasible and more importantly, not always
desirable. A sponsor may not want to be locked in with a contractor who may
then take advantage of the situation to increase his costs. Moreover, setting a
minimal acceptable bid usually requires some information regarding future
possible costs, the evolution of the project and so on. This is not always
available to the sponsor. The following analysis discards both, the use of
complete contracts and the possibility to commit to any specific form of future
negotiation.
If all competitors have the same operating cost but differ in the level of their
potential cost overruns, Spulber (1990) shows that the inability to enforce a
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1 Contracts setting contingent prices, i.e. prices for each and possible future events, are known as
complete contracts.contract can lead all bidders to propose the same bid. In such a situation, the
efficiency and informativeness qualities of an auction are destroyed. The
following analysis relies on a different model and shows in particular that an
auction can preserve its qualities even in the absence of a specific renegotia-
tion contract.
I consider a situation where a sponsor wants to hire a contractor to realise
a project. The contractors are risk neutral and have limited liability. They
differ in their relative efficiency, measured by the expected cost of realising the
project. This expected cost is private information in the sense that each
contractor knows only his own expected cost. The level of liability is the same
for all; it is common knowledge and defined as the maximum amount of losses
that can be sustained. As in Spulber (1990), it is assumed that the sponsor is
unable to use complete contracts and cannot (or refuses to) commit to any form
of future negotiation in the event of bankruptcy. Therefore, contractors have
no information regarding what would happen in the event of a bankruptcy
when submitting tenders. All they know is their expected cost and the
maximum amount of losses they can face.
In the first part of this paper the performances of a first and second price
sealed bid auction are analysed. In a first price auction, the selected contractor
is the one proposing the lowest tender. He is paid his bid. It is the most
common and frequently used form of auction in procurement. In a second price
auction, the lowest tender still wins but the payment is equal to the second
lowest bid. In a second part, I consider the problem of minimising the project’s
cost. The project’s cost is given by the initial contracted price when it is high
enough to avoid bankruptcy, otherwise, it is the contractor’s realised cost to
which are added some fixed bankruptcy costs for which the sponsor is
accountable.2
The analysis of the first and second price auctions lead to the following
conclusions. First, it shows that in the absence of any specific form of
renegotiation, introducing limited liability enhances competition. In both
auctions, tenders fall as the level of liabilities shrinks. This result is in
accordance with the findings of Waehrer (1995) who analyses the
consequences of imposing deposits paid by buyers who chose to default. He
shows that a seller cannot gain by increasing the level of such deposits, as he
would then lessen competition. Analogously, it is shown here that in the
absence of limited liability, i.e. when the contract can be systematically
enforced, competition is weaker. The intuition in either case is clear: as you
oblige the contractors to face more risk (bear more losses) they will be more
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2 The project’s cost should not be understood as the monetary transfer that the sponsor must pay
to guarantee the project’s completion. Analysing such an issue would require that the sponsor be
able to commit to some sort of negotiation in the event of bankruptcy.reluctant to be selected and therefore competition will be weaker. Still, in the
present paper, less competition is shown not to be systematically negative as
it also leads to a lower probability of bankruptcy (in expectation). Second, I
prove that the expected contracted price will be higher in a first price auction.
Thus, the probability of bankruptcy will be lower in a first price auction.
Without limited liability the contracted price would have been the same in
both auctions. However, because limited liability modifies the contractors’
attitude towards risk (making them behave as risk lovers) the contracted
prices will now differ. As the first price auction incorporates less risk
(conditional on winning, uncertainty is eliminated) it generates less
competition. The third conclusion states that in a second price auction there is
always a strictly positive probability that the winning bidder will declare
bankruptcy while in a first price auction, for a sufficiently low cost
uncertainty, some low cost winning suppliers would never declare bankruptcy.
The analysis of cost minimisation is complex. I have been unable to
characterise the exact characteristics of a cost-minimising auction. Still, it is
shown that among all efficient mechanisms in which only the winner gets
paid, the first price auction leads to the highest expected price. Thus, among
efficient mechanisms with payment to the winner only, the first price auction
is the one guaranteeing the lowest expected probability of bankruptcy. The
feature of the first price auction triggering the result is its deterministic price.
Because bidders behave as risk-lovers, they become more competitive (and
thus lower their bids) as there is more uncertainty. Starting from a first price
auction, any attempt to raise the expected contracted price by adding
uncertainty in the payment will generate lower bids. Due to the risk-loving
attitude the decrease in the bids will cause the expected price to fall. Thus,
there is no mechanism including a random payment that will generate an
expected price higher than the first price auction. Finally, a last result
highlights an interesting consequence of bankruptcy. Because bankruptcy is
informative, it permits saving on informational rents. These rents are the
profits that must be left to a contractor to give him the proper incentive to
reveal his cost through his bid (i.e. these rents permit to avoid a pooling
equilibrium). The more efficient a contractor is, the more informational rents
he can extract. By setting a lower bound to the contractor’s profits, limited
liability also sets an upper bound to the amount of informational rents that
must be given away. However, bankruptcy may also generate costs for the
sponsor due to delays in completion. Generally, it is shown that the cost
minimising mechanism results from trading-off bankruptcy costs with
informational rents.
We may now proceed with the analysis. The following section presents the
model. Section II deals with the first and second price auctions. Section III
4 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWconsiders the cost minimisation problem. Finally Section IV presents a
conclusion.
II THE MODEL
Suppose a sponsor (e.g. the government) wants to realise a project. He faces
n risk-neutral, ex ante identical, contractors (or firms). The ex post cost of the
project to each contractor, denoted by ci with  i = 1,...,n  is composed of a
random component s ~ and a firm’s specific component. More precisely let:
ci = θi + s ~. (1)
The random variable s ~ captures the imperfect information a firm has about
the cost of the project ex ante. It models the cost of all unpredictable events
that may occur during the construction phase. Let s ~ be distributed on the
interval [–S ,+S], for some S > 0. Let G(.) denote the distribution function, and
g(.) the density. Without loss of generality assume that
s
E(s ~) =   sg(s) ds = 0
–s
The distribution of s ~ is common knowledge.
The expected cost θi, referred to as firm i’s type, measures contractor i’s
relative efficiency. The lower is θi the more efficient is contractor i with respect
to its competitors. This variable is private information. Beliefs are formed
considering that the variables θi  (i=1,..,n) are independent draws from a
common distribution function, F(.) defined on the interval  θ, θ
–
]s u c h that 
θ – S > 0. The density function, f(.) is assumed to be continuous.
I assume that firms have limited liability. Formally, I consider that there
exists a maximal amount of losses that they can be accounted for. In other
words, their profits are bounded below. For tractability I assume that the
minimum profit is given by –A for all firms. The use of performance bonds
provides a motivation for this symmetry. For projects large enough the sponsor
generally requires that the competitors buy a performance bond. These are
exercised in the event of non-performance. The cover required is generally left
at the discretion of the contracting authority and is generally the same for all
competitors.3 In that context A can be thought of as the value of the bond a
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 5
3 The rules for public procurement in Ireland stipulate the following: For contracts over
200,000IRP Performance Bonds should generally be provided. The provision of the Bond, and the
level of cover required, should be at the discretion of the Contracting Authority, having regard to
all factors concerning the project and the need to protect the financial interests of the Contracting
Authority.contractor must post, and therefore his maximum liability. The amount A is
common knowledge.
The timing of the game is the following. Initially, the sponsor calls for
tenders for a specific project. Even though she knows that competitors have
imperfect information regarding the project’s cost, the sponsor cannot commit
to contingent prices or to any form of renegotiation at this stage. Then, the
competing firms learn their expected cost and bid. Finally, the cost realises. In
the absence of commitment ability all the contractors know is the lower bound
of their profit, set by the limited liability constraint. Similarly, all the sponsor
knows is that the cost will be covered up to a certain limit.
III FIRST AND SECOND PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS
In the absence of limited liability, the risk neutrality and the independent
private value assumptions lead to the well-known revenue equivalence
theorem. The introduction of limited liability breaks this result by modifying
the contractors’ attitude towards risk. Thus auctions, such as the first and
second price sealed bid auctions, that would be otherwise equivalent lead to
different outcomes. In this section I will analyse bidding in these two,
commonly used, auctions. In both, the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) and
the second price sealed bid auction (SPA) the winner is the lowest bid. The
contracted price (denoted P) is equal to the winning bid in a FPA, and to the
second lowest bid in a SPA.
A contractor’s bid maximises his expected profit where the expectation is
taken over his competitors’ types and over the cost uncertainty. Let u(P, θ) be
the profits to a type θ firm when selected and when the contracted price is P.
Under limited liability and in absence of commitment, we have:
u(P, θ) = Es ¯  max  –A, P – (θ +  s ~ )   (2)
where  Es ¯ denotes the expectation taken over the cost uncertainty. This
function is continuous and continuously differentiable in P and  θ (see
Appendix 1). The following notation will be adopted: uk denotes the first
derivative with respect to the argument k (k = 1,2),  uks denotes the first
derivative with respect to argument k (k = 1,2) and second derivative with
respect to argument s (s = 1,2). Figure 1 gives a clearer understanding how
profits are modified under limited liability.
The dashed line corresponds to the profit function in absence of limited
liability. As limited liability is introduced the function u(P, θ) becomes convex
in P (u11 ≥ 0). This means that the risk-neutral contractors behave as risk-
lovers under limited liability.
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Spulber (1990) shows how the absence of commitment can lead to a pooling
equilibrium that destroys the benefits of using an auction. As shown in this
lemma, this result cannot be generalised.
Lemma 1 Ap ooling equilibrium cannot arise unless the minimum level of
profit is zero (A=0).
Proof: Suppose there exists a pooling equilibrium where all contractors
submit the same offer, called b, and each wins with probability 1/n. If for some
θ, u(P, θ)>0,then such types would be better-off decreasing slightly their bid
(to b–ε) so as to be selected for sure and get a positive expected profit. If for
some θ, u(P, θ) < 0, then such types would be better-off increasing their bid not
to be selected and get a zero profit instead of a negative expected profit. Thus
in equilibrium we can only have u(P, θ)=0, for all θ. But the level of P
satisfying u(P, θ)=0 depends on θ. Therefore a pooling equilibrium cannot
exist.
When  A =0  bidding  b = θ – S (or anything below) can form a pooling
equilibrium. In this case, contractors make no profits but cannot improve their
situation by bidding more as they would never be selected if they did so.
Proposition 1 In a SPA a monotone, symmetric dominant strategy
equilibrium bidding function, denoted B2(θ), is given by: 
u(B2(θ), θ) = 0 (3)
Proof: See Appendix 2.
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U(P, θ)
θ – S – A θθ  + S – A PIn a SPA a bid only sets a lower bound for the price at which they may be
contracted. Due to competition, the lowest price they can accept is the one that
would generate zero expected profit.
u1(P, θ)
Proposition 2 In a FPA, if ——–— is increasing in θ, then there exists a mono-
u(P, θ)
tone, symmetric equilibrium bidding function, B1(θ), that is characterised by
(n – 1)f(θ)







) = 0 (5)
Proof: see Appendix 3.
Am ajor difference between the first and second price auction is described
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a SPA there is always a strictly positive probability that the
winning bidder will declare bankruptcy (unless bidders have no liability
constraint, i.e. unless A > S). In a FPA, for a sufficiently low cost uncertainty
some low cost winning suppliers would never declare bankruptcy.
Proof: see Appendix 4.
To  illustrate the latter proposition consider a simple setting where s ~  is
uniformly distributed and A=  0 . In such a case, the SPA equilibrium bidding
function is given by: 
B2(θ) = θ – S.
In a FPA a monotone, symmetric equilibrium bidding function is given by:
θ∗
S (1 – F(θ*))n–1 +    1 – F(t) n–1 dt
θ
B1(θ) = θ + ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– for θ ≤ θ ˆ, (6)
 1 – F(θ) n–1
and
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   1 – F(t) 
n–1 — 2 dt
θ
B1(θ) = θ – S +  –––––––––––––– for θ ≥ θ ˆ, (7)
 1 – F(θ) 
n–1 — 2
where θ ˆ = max{θ, θ*} where θ* satisfies B1(θ*) = θ*. Thus, all types below θ*
will always complete the project for no more than the contracted price. For
types above θ* limited liability may bind depending on the realisation of the
shock. Whether θ* ≥θdepends on the value of S. As the cost uncertainty
increases, more types offer tenders below their highest possible cost.
In the absence of limited liability we know that the sponsor would be
indifferent between the FPA and the SPA. Both mechanisms lead to the same
expected contracted price and therefore to the same expected cost. This
equivalence breaks down under limited liability.
Proposition 4 The FPA leads to a higher expected contracted price than the
SPA.
Proof: see Appendix 5.
The proof shows that the expected price to each type (but type θ
–
) in a SPA
is at most equal to their bid in a FPA, and strictly below for some types (on the
left of  θ
–
). The intuition is obvious. Risk-lover bidders value more the marginal
increase in the rent resulting from slightly increasing their bid than the
resulting marginal decrease in the probability of winning. Thus, as they have
more control over their rent in a FPA, bidders are less competitive than in a
SPA.
From this proposition one must not conclude that the SPA should be
systematically favoured. The contracted price is only one component of the cost
of the project. Because the SPA leads to a lower expected contracted price, the
likelihood of bankruptcy is higher (in expectation). If the sponsor faces high
bankruptcy costs due to delays in completion, or the need of renegotiating, he
would be better-off paying a higher price initially.
Finally, the following proposition formally states the implication of limited
liability on the bidding behaviour.
Proposition 5 Limited liability induces the firms to lower their bids in both
the FPA and the SPA.
Proof: See Appendix 6.
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Thus, it gives all bidders an incentive to bid more aggressively. Still, as we
stressed before, the change in the attitude towards risk triggers a
countervailing incentive to the preceding one. (An increase in the marginal
gain has more value than its associated decrease in the probability of
winning.) This trade-off appears clearly when considering the close form
solution given as an example. All bidders potentially facing a binding limited
liability constraint bid according to: 
θ ¯
   1 – F(t) 
n–1 — 2 dt
θ
B1(θ) = θ – S +  ––––––––––––––  (8)
 1 – F(θ) 
n–1 — 2
This expression would be the equilibrium bidding function prevailing in
absence of limited liability when a bidder has a (lower) cost equal to (θ – S) and
n – 1
faces (less) —–— competitors. The first term reflects the greater competitive-
2
ness. Bidders somehow consider the lowest possible cost as their cost. The
second reflects the countervailing incentive as it corresponds to the margin a
n – 1
risk neutral bidder would get when facing —–— competitors instead of n – 1.
2
In equilibrium the first incentive dominates the second.
As bidders are more competitive, the contracted price falls when limited
liability is introduced. Once again, this is not systematically positive for the
sponsor, as it is then more likely that the contractor will not be able to cover
the cost ex post. From that perspective, limited liability offers a rationale for
the frequency and the size of cost overruns in public contracting.
IV COST MINIMISATION ANALYSIS
Consider now a situation where the sponsor initially designs a procurement
contract, i.e. a rule that tells bidders whom will be selected and how much he
will be paid as a function of the types they sequentially announce. Assume
that the sponsor’s goal is to minimise the (expected) cost of the project. This
cost is given by the contracted price whenever it is sufficiently high to
guarantee a profit above –A. Otherwise, the sponsor knows that the cost is
given by the realisation of  (θw + s) where θw, the winner’s announced type and
s are both initially random. For tractability, I consider mechanisms where only
the selected firm gets paid.4
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4 Extension to more complex mechanisms will be discussed.Let Θ ˆ = (θ ˆ1,…, θ ˆn) be a vector of types (potentially different from the true
types) and let θ ˆ–ibe a vector of all types except bidder i’s type. In particular we
have Θ ˆ = (θ ˆ–i, θ ˆi). Let Θ be the vector of true types.  Formally, a contract is
defined as a set of functions {xi(Θ ˆ), Pi(Θ ˆ)}i=1,…,n. The function xi(Θ ˆ) gives the
probability of selecting firm i. The function Pi gives the price at which firm i is
contracted if selected when Θ ˆ is announced. Most rules will lead contractors to
announce a type different from their true type. However, the revelation
principle tells us that any rule has an equivalent direct contracting scheme in
which contractors find it optimal to reveal their true type. Thus, among all
mechanisms we only need to consider those who lead to revelations of true
types: {xi(Θ), Pi(Θ)}i=1,…,n. Under incentive compatibility, the project’s cost may
then be written as: 
Pi(Θ)–θi+AS
Ti(Θ)  =         Pi(Θ)g(s ~) ds ~ +          (θi + s ~ + C)g(s ~) ds ~ (9)
–S Pi(Θ)–θi+A
where C includes all bankruptcy costs for which the sponsor is accountable
such as costs due to delays in completion.
Given a contracting scheme, the profit to firm i when announcing type θ ˆi
while others report truthfully is given by:
π(θ ˆi, θi) = Eθ–i  xi(θ ˆi, θ–i)u(Pi(θ ˆi, θ–i)θi)]. (10)
Let  π(θi, θi)   Π(θi). The cost-minimising contract must guarantee
voluntary participation (VP) and incentive compatibility (IC). I will assume
that outside opportunities are such that the reservation rents are zero. Thus
VP holds if and only if 
Π(θi) ≥ 0 for all i.
IC holds if and only if:
θi   arg max π (θ ˆi, θi). 
θi
From (9) we can see that the cost-minimising contract depends on C. If
bankruptcy is particularly costly to the sponsor, he should design a mechanism
that limits bankruptcy, i.e. offer a high contracted price.
Proposition 6 If u2(P, θ) is convex in P then the FPA gives the highest expected
contracted price among all efficient mechanisms in which only the selected firm
gets paid.
Proof: See Appendix 7.
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concave or linear. It means5 that the degree of risk lovingness increases with
θ i.e. with inefficiency.
The FPA is not a direct mechanism in which it is optimal for bidders to tell
their true type. However, as argued above, it has an equivalent incentive
compatible direct mechanism that maximises the expected contracted price.
The feature of the FPA (and of its equivalent IC mechanism) triggering the
result is its deterministic price. In a FPA bidders know exactly what they will
be paid if they win: their own bid. Therefore, conditional on winning,
uncertainty is eliminated. Because bidders behave as risk-lovers, they are
more competitive under more uncertainty. Starting from a FPA, any attempt
to raise the expected contracted price by adding uncertainty in the payment
will generate lower bids. Due to the risk-loving attitude the decrease in the
bids will cause the expected price to fall. Thus, there is no mechanism
including a random payment that will generate an expected price higher than
the FPA’s expected price.
Unfortunately it is difficult to characterise the cost minimising mechanism
for each possible value of C. Still, the following lemma highlights an
interesting feature of such contracts.
Lemma 3 The cost minimising contract results from trading off informational
rents and renegotiation costs.
Proof: The sponsor solves:
n
min         EΘ xi(Θ) Ti(Θ)] (11)
{xi(Θ),Pi(Θ)}i=1,…,n     i=1
n
subject to (IC), (VP) and    xi(Θ) ≤ 1 with   i, xi(Θ)    0, 1 .
i=1
By adding and substituting the cost, we can rewrite the objective function
as:6
n
min         EΘ xi(Θ) Hi(Θ)]
{xi(Θ),Pi(Θ)}i=1,…,n    i=1
where
F(θi)
H(Θ) = δ(Pi(Θ), θi)  θi + —–—  + (1 – δ(Pi(Θ),  θi))(C + A + θi)( 12)
f(θi)
and where δ(Pi(Θ), θi) is the probability of not facing a binding limited liability
constraint:
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5 See Lemma 1 in Maskin and Riley (1984).
6 See Myerson (1981) for a detailed procedure, as well as Appendix 8.δ(P, θ) = G(P–   θ + A). (13)
Interestingly, expression (12) tells us that with no commitment there is an
upper bound to the informational rents that must be given away to guarantee
incentive compatibility. When contracting under asymmetric information, a
sponsor must give away some rents to guarantee a truthful revelation of types.
F(θi)
The expression  θi + —–—  is the so-called virtual cost from selecting bidder i.
f(θi)
It takes into account the informational rents to be left to firm i to guarantee
incentive compatibility. Without limited liability these rents would
systematically be paid. In the event of bankruptcy giving an amount A
guarantees that the winner makes zero profits whatever he reveals. Thus,
under bankruptcy paying A guarantees IC.
Finally the following results can easily be shown:
1. Setting a minimal acceptable bid in a first price auction would deter
efficiency (provided the minimal acceptable bid is above Bi(θ)). As a
consequence the sponsor will not always benefit from using such a
strategy since inefficient contractors are more likely to face bankruptcy.
2. The mechanisms allowing for payments to all competitors can increase
competition (and thus lower the contracted price) if losers must pay a
fee. Alternatively, giving a bonus to losers can increase the contracted
price. This follows from the risk-loving attitude. To reduce competition
the sponsor can provide some insurance to bidders. Lowering the gap
between the gain upon losing and the gain  upon winning is one way of
doing so.
V CONCLUSION
Although limited liability together with the inability to commit to any form
of future negotiation may still preserve the informativeness and efficiency
qualities of an auction, they have non-negligible impacts. As it was shown, it
leads to a more competitive behaviour in both a first and second price auction.
Thus, bidders with limited liabilities face a higher risk of bankruptcy. This
could explain the frequency of cost overruns and need of renegotiation in
procurement. If we consider efficient auctions in which only the winner gets
paid then a rationale for the use of a first price auction can be that it
minimises bankruptcy (in expectation). It leads the sponsor to pay a higher
price initially. Provided the cost uncertainty is low enough, it may lead the
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 13most efficient bidders to never face bankruptcy. Finally, this paper shows that
bankruptcy is not always negative as it permits savings on informational
rents.
I have taken the view here that bidders differ in their efficiency level. Still,
we know that other factors differentiate bidders. It would be interesting to
extend this analysis to a model where contractors differ in their level of
liabilities. If, as shown, the lowest offer is proposed by the one having the least
liabilities, should he still be selected? How can auction rules be designed in
such a case to make sure that renegotiation will never be needed?
VI APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Analysing the function u(P, θ).
We have:
– A if  P – θ ≤ – S – A
u(P, θ)= 
û(P, θ) if P – θ     – S – A, S – A 
P–   θ if P –  θ ≥ – S – A,
where
P–θ+A
û(P, θ)=    (P–   (θ + s ~))g(s ~) ds ~ – A(1 – G(P–   θ + A))
–S
u(P, θ) is continuous in P since
lim     û(P, θ)=  –  A and    lim   û(P, θ)=   P–   θ.
P→θ–S–A P→θ+S–A
Similarly, it is continuous in θ since
lim     û(P, θ)=  –  A and    lim   û(P, θ)=   P–   θ.
P→θ+A+S                                          θ→P+A–S
Regarding first partial derivatives we have:
0 if  P – θ ≤ – S – A
u1(P, θ)= 
G(P–   θ + A) if P – θ     – S – A, S – A 
1 if P –  θ ≥ S – A,
and
0 if  P – θ ≤ – S – A
u2(P, θ)= 
–G(P–   θ + A) if P – θ     – S – A, S – A 
–1 if P –  θ ≥ S – A.
Continuity of each partial derivatives is obvious.
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The function u(P, θ) is non-decreasing in P and non-increasing in θ.
Therefore, the function B2(θ), such that u(B2(θ), θ)=0, is non-decreasing.
Consider now type θ. If she wins when bidding B2(θ) her expected gain will be
positive and there is no alternative bid that would make her better off. Indeed,
a lower bid would have no effect while a higher bid increases the probability
of losing and thus ending up with no revenue. If she loses when bidding B2(θ)
it means that the winning bid B*i s such that u(B*, θ) ≤ 0. Therefore,
undercutting that bid would make her worse-off as the expected gain could be
negative. Once again, there is no alternative to B2(θ) that could make her
better off.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume there exist a symmetric equilibrium bidding function B1(θ). Assume
it is an increasing and continuous function. Because type θ
–
never wins it must








) > 0, type θ
–
would be better off lowering its offer slightly so as to win a positive expected









– ε) < 0 for ε small enough. Therefore, type θ
– 
– ε would be better-
off bidding B1(θ
–
) and never win.
If B1(θ) is an equilibrium bidding function, the following must hold: 
θ   arg max (1 – F(t))n–1 u(B1(t), θ)
t
The first order condition can be written as 
u1(B1(t), θ)            (n – 1)f(t)
(1 – F(t))  –—–—––— B' 1(t) – –—–—–—  =0   at t = θ
u(B1(t), θ)               1 – F(t)
u1(P, θ)
If ———– is increasing in θ then
u(P, θ)
u1(B1(t), θ)          (n – 1)f(t)  >           >
————— B' 1(t) – –———— — 0 as t — θ.
u(B1(t), θ)         1 – F(t)  <            <
Therefore the function (1 – F(t))n–1 u(B1(t), θ) reaches a maximum at t = θ
as required.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3.
• The second price auction.
The equilibrium bidding function is such that u(B2(θ), θ)=0 . Thus, any
equilibrium bidding function is such that B2(θ) ≤ θ. Indeed, any bid greater
than the expected cost (b > θ) would be such that u(b,θ)>θ.
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 15The only possibility to have, as a solution,  B2(θ)=θ arises when u(θ, θ)=0 .
Since the expected cost is equal to θ, u(θ, θ)=0   when the bidder has enough
liability to cover any potential loss (i.e. when A ≥ S). If instead A<  S , then 
u(θ, θ)>0  and the equilibrium bid is such that b < θ. In that case, 
b –( θ + S) < – A and the winning bidder will declare bankruptcy with a strictly
positive probability.
• The first price auction.
Let A = 0. In a first price auction, the least efficient bidder still proposes a




)=0 . Thus, B1(θ
–




]. The function B1(θ) is
such that  B' 1(θ)<1(see expressions (6) and (7) in the text). Thus, moving
backwards from θ
– 
it eventually cuts the function (θ + S). Provided S is small
enough, there exists a unique  θ*    θ, θ
–
] such that B1(θ*) =  θ*+S and such
that B1(θ)>θ + S for all θ < θ*. As A increases, bids increase as bidders have
to cover more losses. Thus, the range of bidders bidding above their highest
cost increases.
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 47
Let b2(θ) be the expected contracted price paid to type θ in a SPA. We will




(n – 1)(1 – F(t))n–2f(t)
b2 (θ) =   B2(t)– —–––––––––—––— dt
(1– F(θ))n–1
θ
Differentiating both sides with respect to θ, we get 
(n – 1)f(θ)
b' 2 (θ) = –—–––— (b2 (θ) – B2 (θ)).
1– F(θ)
While, for a FPA we have 
(n – 1)f(θ)    u(B1 (θ), θ)
B' 1 (θ) = ––—–––—  ––––––––––.







). Therefore, showing that B' 1(θ) ≤ b' 2(θ)
whenever B1(θ) = b2(θ) proves that B1(θ) is (almost) everywhere above b2(θ).
8
We need to show that 
u(B1 (θ), θ)
–––––––––– ≤ B1(θ) – B2(θ). (14)
u1(B1 (θ), θ)
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7 This proof follow the steps of Maskin and Riley (1984) proof of theorem 4.
8 Starting at θ
– 
we compare the functions for values to the left of θ
–
.Consider the right and left hand sides as functions of b where b   B1(θ).
Note that at b = B2(θ) both sides vanish. The derivative of the left-hand side
u11u
(with respect to b) is 1 – ——. The derivative of the right-hand side (with
u1
2
respect to b) is 1. Because u11 ≥ 0, and because b = B1(θ) > B2(θ), (14) holds.
Thus, b2(θ) ≤ B1(θ) for all θ. Moreover for types facing a potentially binding
limited liability constraint u11 > 0. This is the case for all types close enough to
θ
–
. Therefore there exists ε > 0 such that b2(θ
– 
– ε) < B1(θ
– 
– ε).
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 5.
The FPA equilibrium bidding function without limited liability, b1(θ) solves:
(n – 1)f(θ)















) = 0. Because limited liability
gives a lower bound to  u(P, θ
–




). Moreover, for all P and
θ, u1(P, θ)    0, 1] and  u(P, θ) ≥ P – θ. Thus, for all θ such that B1(θ) = b1(θ) =
b, we have B' 1(θ) ≥ b' 1(θ). Thus it is true that B1(θ) ≤ b1(θ) for all θ.
Appendix 7: Proof of Proposition 6.
I show that if  u2(P, θ) is convex in P, then the first price auction is the one
giving rise to the higher expected contracted price, among all mechanisms
selecting the most efficient firm. The proof consists in showing that the FPA is
the mechanism that maximises the bidders revenue. It is done in 5 steps. In
what follows I refer to the expected contracted price as the price at which the
selected firm is contracted given its type. Finally, the contracted price is the
expectation of this price over the winner’s type. At some stage, this proof relies
on the necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee IC. These will be
found in Appendix 8.
Step 1: In a FPA the equilibrium bidding function is uniquely defined.
Moreover, there does not exist any other efficient mechanism in which the
expected contracted price is deterministic. Indeed, it can be shown that if the
contracted price is, instead of the winning bid, any monotone transformation
of this bid then we will have as an equilibrium bidding function the
corresponding monotone transformation of the bidding function. Hence any
rules that are monotone transformations of the FPA are equivalent to the FPA.
No monotone transformations are excluded since I restrict attention to
efficient rules.
Step 2: By construction we have
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 17u2(P, θ) = – G(P – θ + A)
Thus,  u2(P, θ) is convex in P if and only if G(.) is concave. This requirement
is not satisfied around P = θ – S – A. However, there is no loss in generalities
from considering among all IC mechanisms including a random payment only
the ones where Pi(θ) ≥ θi – S – A.
Proof: Consider an IC payment scheme such that for some realisations of θi.
Define P ˆ
i(θ) such that:
Pi(θ) when Pi(θ) ≥ θi – S – A,
P ˆ
i(θ) =  ————–––––––––——————
θi – S – A when Pi(θ) < θi – S – A.
We  obviously have ∀θi, π(Pi(θ), θi)=π(P ˆ
i(θ), θi), since any payment 
Pi(θ) < θi – S – A gives a rent equal to –A to the contractor.
Step 3: In any IC mechanism the bidders’ revenue is continuous. This can be
shown following Maskin and Riley (1984).
Step 4: The bidders’ revenue is maximised in a FPA.
Let Π1(θi) and Π ˜(θi) be the gains of a type θi firm resulting from a FPA and
any other IC mechanism including a random payment, P ˜(θ), respectively. Let
P1(θi) and EP ˜(θi) denote the expected contracted price of each mechanism.
Note that in a FPA, the contracted price is deterministic and thus equal to the




EP ˜(θi)    P ˜(θi) ——––——— dθ–i.
(1 – F(θi))n–1
θi
I will show that whenever Π1(θi) = Π ˜
1 '(θi) < Π ˜'(θi). Given that Π1(θ
–
) = Π ˜(θ
–
) 
= 0 in any IC mechanism, and given that the gains are continuous, this implies
that Π1(θi) > Π ˜(θi)for all θi. (Remember that we are interested in what happens
to the left of θ
–
.)
Since contractors act as risk lovers, the rents from a deterministic (FPA)
mechanism equal the rents from a random mechanism only if the expected
contracted price in the deterministic mechanism is higher. In other words:
Π1(θi) = Π ˜(θi) ⇒ P1(θi) > EP ˜(θi) 
Recall that the FOC for IC gives (see Appendix 8):
θ
–
Π'(θi)    u2 (P, θ) f(θ–i) dθ–i.( 15)
θi
18 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWSince u2(P, θ) is decreasing in P, we have:
P1(θi) > EP ˜(θi) ⇒ u2 (P1(θi), θi) ≤ u2 (EP ˜(θi), θi)( 16)
If, in addition, u2 (P, θ) is convex in P, we have, using Jensen’s inequality:
u2 (EP ˜(θi), θi) ≤ EP ˜  u2 (P ˜(θ), θi) / θi = min
j
θj  (17)
Given (15), (16) and (17)
P1(θi) > EP ˜(θi) ⇒Π ' 1(θi) <  Π ˜'(θi) 
Step 5: If u(P, θ) is convex in P and given that the bidders’ gain increase
with the expected contracted price, we have:
Π1(θi) >  Π ˜(θi) ⇒ u(P1(θi), θi) ≥ u(EP ˜(θi), θi)
⇒∀ θi, P1(θi) ≥ EP ˜(θi)
Thus, at any point the FPA gives a higher expected contracted price to 
firm i.
Appendix 8: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for IC.
Lemma 2: Am echanism {xi(Θ), Pi(Θ)}i=1,…,n satisfies IC if and only if
Π'(θi) = –   xi(Θ)δ (Pi(Θ), θi) f(θ–i) dθ–i,( 18)
θ–i
and




(⇒) By definition, an IC mechanism is such that






π(r, θi) =    xi(r, θ–i) u(Pi(r, θ–i), θi)  f(θ–i) dθ–i (21)
θ
Using the envelope theorem, we have:
∂π(r, θi)
Π'(θi) = ————   (22)
∂θi           r=θi
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 19Since u2(P, θ) = –δ(P, θ), where δ(P, θ) is defined by (13), (22) is equivalent to
(18).
The second order condition is:
∂2π(r, θi)
————   ≤ 0.
∂r2 r=θi
Recall the first order condition:
∂π(r, θi)
——–—     = 0.
∂r r=θi
Differentiating the above with respect to r on both sides, we get:
∂2π(r, θi)          ∂2π(r, θi)
————  + ————    = 0.
∂r2 r=θi               ∂r∂θi       r=θi
Thus, the second order condition can be written as:
∂2π(r, θi) 
————  ≥ 0,
∂r∂θi      r=θi 
which leads to (19).




Π(s) – Π(r) = –      xi(t, θ–i) δ(Pi(t, θ–i), t) f(θ–i) dθ–i  dt (23)
s θ
Moreover, by construction, we have:
π(r, s) – Π(r) =
θ
–
  xi(r, θ–i)  u(Pi(r, θ–i), s) –  u(Pi(r, θ–i), r)  f(θ–i) dθ–i.( 24)
θ
We can rewrite (24) as
s  θ
–
–      xi(r, θi) δ(Pi(r, θi), t) f(θ–i) dθ–i  dt
r θ
Using (19) it is then trivial to show that, given and r and s,
Π(s) – Π(r) ≥π (r, s) – Π(r)
which implies IC.
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